Will Russia's New Leader launch
Soviet-style regulation of the Net

A group of Russian Internet organizations have issued an alert to the Internet industry in the West: recent Internet regulatory proposals signed by acting President Vladimir Putin may signal a return to a repressive climate of Cold War-era information control policies in Russia. And on February 17, 2000, the Russian government disclosed that one of its most controversial initiatives, the Echelon-like Internet wiretapping program known as SORM, is now fully implemented and enforceable.

SORM, a Russian acronym for System for Operational Investigative Activities, has been the subject of intense debate since first appearing in a 1995 regulation granting security services the right to monitor telecommunications under court warrant. In 1998, public concern increased as the FSB (Federal Security Service, an inheritor agency of the KGB) added a regulation called SORM-2 requiring ISP's to install technology channels routing copies of online traffic to the FSB. Each ISP was required to pay for the FSB linkup on its own at an estimated cost of $10,000-30,000 USD, a significant hardship for smaller providers. SORM-2 would enable the FSB to eavesdrop all Internet activity from emails to e-purchases, without any corresponding means to ensure court warrants had been obtained.

But whether or not the covert program had actually been effected was unclear until a televised announcement on February 17, 2000 by Alexei Rokotyan of Russia's Ministry of Communications. He announced SORM's complete implementation, stating "Security organs and special forces have the right - and now the capability - to monitor private correspondence and telephone conversations of individual citizens in the name of establishing legal order," In an attempt to downplay criticism, Rokotyan stated SORM is intended only to monitor "individual cases according to the law… we are speaking not about establishing a system of global surveillance of the Internet, or total control of information transmitted via the global network." But Europemedia editor and Russian Internet conference organizer (http://www.adminltd.com/eng/conferences/forum00.html) Michael Novikov sees things differently: "Basically, this means democracy on the Internet is over," he commented from St. Petersburg, "They tried to keep it quiet for so long because they were afraid of opposition or noncooperation from ISP's… this means there is no more opposition, except from the press."

One of the recent regulatory drafts signed by Putin, "On the State Registration of Mass Media using Global Information Networks for the Dissemination of Information," could transform legal status of Russia's Internet into that of a new "Network Mass Media" -- and create an infrastructure for censorship of the .ru Internet domain. If enacted, the proposal would subject Russian businesses, political groups and citizens who publish web sites to registration procedures, license fees, and other restrictions similar to those already imposed offline on Russian TV and news agencies. Another draft, "On Assigning and Using Domain Names in the Russian Sector of the Internet," would make the Russian Federation's Ministry of Press the exclusive registrar of all .ru domains, and "require companies and organizations to create an official web site in the .ru domain displaying information about their founders and activities by December 31, 2000." The drafts assign responsibility for ongoing regulation of "Runet," as the .ru domain is regionally nicknamed, to Russia's Ministry of Press. Online publishers would be required to pay a registration fee ranging from 150 rubles (about $5.00 USD) for children's sites, to 150,000 rubles (about $5,200.00 USD) for sites specializing in "information of an erotic character."

The developments sparked widespread opposition within Russia's Internet industry, inspiring a number of Internet organizations to create an Open Letter to the Russian Federation in January, 2000 (http://www.libertarium.ru/eng/oplet.PDF), which protests "excessive and harmful regulation," and proposes the government disclose "all regulatory initiatives …for open and public discussion."

Under the proposed Internet regulatory drafts, Russian web publishers must submit an application documenting the site's subject matter and audience; sources of financing; identity of founder(s) with registered place of residence and passport number; names of site editorial staff; physical address of its editorial office; and information on any other sites or media properties for which the applicant is a founder, proprietor, editor, publisher, or distributor. Applicants would be required to preserve electronic copies of all materials published online, and documentation of the date and time content is added, changed or removed from the site.

If the regulations are enacted, publishers of existing sites who fail to comply with initial registration requirements by June 30, risk being shut down. Sites operated by government entities would be exempt from the proposed regulation, as would private corporate networks.

"This thing is appalling. I've seen a lot of efforts on the part of various governments to regulate the Internet and this is one of the worst I've seen," said EFF (http://www.eff.org) co-founder and former Grateful Dead lyricist John Perry Barlow. " I'm alarmed for a variety of reasons, but primarily that a major government would regard the Internet as a mass medium. It's not a mass medium, it's an environment."

The proposed Internet restrictions emerge amid increased restriction on freedom of information in general within Russia. Widespread allegations of military censorship and human rights abuses against journalists covering the war in Chechnya have drawn fire from international human rights groups and press associations. Valerii Lugovoi, Executive Director for the Kaluga branch of the Russian nonprofit New Perspectives Foundation, noted in February, 2000, that "In the past three or four months, State authorities began limiting reporters' access to specific Russian regions such as Chechnya using legislative means. They established special structures for 'official' information, such as the Rosinform agency, and prepared regulation for the mandatory accreditation of reporters."

International concern over the Russian government's increasingly authoritarian stance toward media heightened in January, 2000, when award-winning Radio free Europe/Radio Liberty (http://www.rferl.org) correspondent Andrei Babitsky, an outspoken military critic, disappeared after being taken into Russian military custody. The 35-year-old Babitsky, whose reports from the war zone often contradicted the government's official story, is one of few Russian journalists ever to report from the Chechen rebel side of the battlefield. In mid-January he was detained by Russian authorities who threatened to prosecute him for "participating in a terrorist organization," and Putin himself was said to have "taken the case under his personal control." On February 3, Putin's staff reported the military had swapped Babitsky to rebels in exchange for five Russian soldier POW's, an apparent violation of the Geneva convention's protection of journalists as noncombatants.

On February 17, thirty Russian media organizations joined together in support of Babitsky to publish a special edition of Obshchaya Gazeta, or "Joint Newspaper", reviving a protest tradition born during the 1991 media crackdown preceding the fall of the Soviet Union. Representatives of Russia's Journalist Union declared in the publication, "A threat to freedom of speech in Russia has for the first time in the last several years transformed into its open and regular suppression." and described the Babitsky case "not as an isolated episode, but a turning point in the struggle for a press that serves the society and not the authorities."

Six weeks later, Babitsky re-emerged at a detainment center in Dagestan, reportedly charged by Russian authorities with posessing a forged Azerbajani passport. On February 28, Putin said he saw no reason to continue detaining Babitsky, and on the following day the reporter was released and flown home to Moscow by military aircraft.

According to Novikov, news of the most recent Internet regulatory drafts first surfaced in December, 1999, a few days after Putin held an historic meeting with 20 representatives of Russia's Internet industry. Putin's Internet proposals were first published on the Lenta.ru news site (http://www.lenta.ru/Internet/2000/01/18/inet_smi/), and other leaks soon followed. "It seems that as early as Fall of 1999, Putin's government was busy preparing the proposals," said Novikov, " and the documents were leaked as soon as it became clear he would rule."

The Russian Internet community's immediate reaction, Novikov recalls, was "surprise, distrust and fear." Public discussion spread offline at industry events, and online at discussion sites like http://www.libertarium.ru and http://www.infoart.ru. More recently, he adds, a trend toward self-organization has emerged, as evidenced by a proliferation of Internet-focused NGO's.

Anatoly Levenchuk, who operates Moscow-based digital freedom site Libertarium.ru and helped organize the Open Letter, says the drafts would "make the homepage of any citizen equivalent to a major National newspaper." The drafts are not laws, he is quick to emphasize, "Laws must be passed through the Duma. This is a Government Act that can be signed by a prime-minister without any discussions at all, but which has no less power than a law." The Open Letter states that Russia's evolving Net infrastructure is better served by self-regulatory industry coalitions than by overly restrictive Federal legislation. The letter also demands a repeal of SORM, states the need for an Electronic Document and Digital Signature law and calls for legislation requiring government entities to disclose information online.

The Internet's inherently decentralized nature conflicts with the Russian government's traditional tendency toward "secrecy and isolation," said Yuri Vdovin, Vice-President of St. Petersburg-based human rights NGO Citizens Watch (http://www.wplus.net/pp/citwatch). "It's physically impossible to establish real control over the Internet, but the adoption of certain normative acts will make it possible for officials to apply repressive measures to 'inconvenient' people and organizations."

The relatively miniscule scale of Internet adoption in Russia makes its proposed "network mass media" status all the more conspicuous during this Russian presidential election year. In 1999, only approximately 1% of all Russians were online, compared with over a third of North Americans. According to Michel Tatu, observer for the European Institute for Media's "Media and Democracy Program" (www.eim.de), during the 1999 election year "the influence of the Internet …on voters was marginal, far behind the role of television, newspapers and radio." But Internet use in Russia is growing exponentially, he notes, "It is doubling every year and one can say that Russia, despite its backwardness in many areas, is… bypassing the phase of the individual, unconnected PC which characterized the development of computers in western countries in the 1980's." Tatu is developing a report for EIM on the role of the Internet in Russia's electoral process, and believes it has proven to be a powerful catalyst for political awareness. "Despite its still-limited audience, the Internet has helped to develop, more than any other media, the interest for political life and civic activism…it can do much to organize democratic forces and promote interactive cooperation in this area, at a national and even international level."

Barlow notes that ironically the career of Vladimir Putin, a former KGB agent, has in effect benefited from the Internet's revolutionary potential. "Putin would not be in power had it not been for the fact that the KGB coup failed," said Barlow, referring to the thwarted takeover on August 19, 1991 by hard-line communist party leaders, four months before the USSR's breakup. "The Internet was one of the primary reasons the coup failed -- it was one of the first examples of how Internet communications empowered people to overthrow centralized power. The KGB were using traditional information systems, while the people who were supporting Gorbachev, glasnost and perestroika were using the Internet to distribute postscript files of the streets of Moscow…presumably Putin was an employee of the KGB at that point. He's the beneficiary of a government that exists because of the Internet, yet he's trying to clamp down on the Internet."

Heavy-handed regulation of Russia's Internet could cause further damage to Russia's already troubled economy, Barlow cautions. "They're slitting their throats economically. If Russia wants to become a player in the global economy, they're going to have to engage in electronic commerce like every other successful post-industrial country." Restrictive Internet policies could lead to fewer loans, investments and trade opportunities from the West. "In an information economy, there's no difference between freedom of expression and freedom of commerce."

Vica Vinogradova of Russian interactive agency Ladno (http://www.ladno.com) believes whether or not they are ultimately enacted, the proposals are a direct threat of state censorship. "This could be the first sign of a bigger crackdown. It really doesn't make sense to close down just one tool of mass media, and leave the others out. The new regulation differs from traditional media in a sense that one has to have capital to start a magazine, newspaper or TV program, but the Internet is an inexpensive way to publish information.… the newest and most important communication tool is being restricted, this directly affects the younger generation of Russia."

Vinogradova fears the proposals may indicate an imminent return of some of the most restrictive aspects of Soviet-era law. "It used to be illegal to own an unregistered Xerox machine, because that meant dissemination of information uncontrolled by the State. If Internet publications must retain copies of what's published on their site, that means keeping 'traces' for possible investigation. The motivation behind these drafts is to control what information is published and stop the spread of free information by applying a price tag. "

Novikov believes broader discussion of these issues in Western media could influence whether the controversial drafts are enacted. "The State has finally realized that the Internet is a powerful tool, and they want to control that... If the US Internet industry demonstrates concern," he predicts, "this would definitely force Russian partners to be open about their position on the matter, and consequently impact the Russian government."

Some in Russia speculate the drafts are only election-year posturing, and unlikely to actually become law. Within weeks of the forthcoming election in which Putin is the clear favorite, the logic goes, the subject could be dropped and no new Internet regulations enacted. Regardless, these developments may be an ominous foreshadowing of the degree to which a new Russian leadership, with Putin likely at the helm, is prepared to support unrestricted exchange of information. How the situation will evolve in the coming months to come is unclear, but if early signs are any indication, Russia's Internet community is prepared to fight for freedom of information online.

"Any effort anywhere to successfully clamp down on the Internet corrodes the liberty of the whole domain," warns Barlow. "Success by any government in restricting access to this environment is toxic. The Internet is all of one piece, and if it can be controlled anywhere it can be controlled everywhere."

[Open Letter to the Russian Federation can be viewed online
at Libertarium.ru site: http://www.libertarium.ru/eng/oplet.PDF]

Xeni Jardin (xeni@xeni.net) is a journalist specializing in international technology trends. She has dual citizenship in Silicon Valley and the Digital Coast.